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Real convergence in the recently acceded EU member states (RAMS) is taking place in a 
new environment, with important implications for convergence and vulnerabilities. 
Financial liberalization can increase temporary imbalances, while financial integration 
provides the necessary external finance to support the larger current account deficits 
involved. Thus, periods during which relative prices are distorted and resources are not 
reallocated to reach a new equilibrium can be lengthened. When prices are sticky, the 
exchange rate regime matters in the short run: a fixed exchange rate regime generates a 
larger current account deficit than a flexible exchange rate regime. That is, the extent of 
vulnerability to adjustment risk will depend on several factors, and trade-offs between 
these, including price stickiness, the extent of unhedged balance sheet exposures, and the 
degree of nominal flexibility afforded by the exchange rate regime. Financial 
liberalization and integration may also lead to sizable changes in the composition of final 
demand, and through this, considerable movements in the equilibrium real exchange rate. 
It may therefore be a challenging task for policymakers to achieve fast and steady 
nominal convergence in certain phases of convergence in this new environment. The 
paper discusses the challenges policymakers in RAMS face and the policies that can 
make the convergence process faster and smoother. 
Keywords: real and financial convergence, financial integration, recently acceded EU 
member states. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
The concept of speed limits to real convergence can be interpreted in two different 
ways. It can mean factors that limit or enhance potential growth in the recently acceded 
EU member states (RAMS)—in other words, speed limits to the potential pace of real 
convergence. But it can also mean factors that limit adjustment capacity and/or create 
market imperfections and rigidities, that is, speed limits due to vulnerabilities. Both are 
important and will be dealt with in this paper. 
Regarding the former, recent research findings offer empirical evidence on the role 
of several non-traditional growth factors that are of particular importance in 
RAMS. These include the quality of institutions, the size and efficiency of government, 
and the development of the financial sector and financial integration.
2 
More attention to nontraditional growth factors reflects the fact that real 
convergence in RAMS is taking place in a new environment.  The differences from 
previous convergence episodes are attributable to several factors, including financial 
integration, globalization, and European integration. RAMS also have important 
characteristics that are different from those of previously converging economies, such as 
the level of education or cross-border mobility of labor force.  
These differences in environment and characteristics also have important 
implications for the speed limits due to vulnerabilities. On the one hand, financial 
liberalization—which provides a historically unique opportunity to use foreign savings to 
accelerate real convergence—can also increase the amplitude of certain cyclical elements, 
while financial integration, in large part due to European integration, can provide the 
necessary external finance for the kind of current account deficits that these larger 
deviations may generate. That is, these factors may lengthen the periods during which 
relative prices are distorted and resources are not reallocated to reach a new equilibrium.   
It may be a challenging task for policymakers to achieve fast and steady nominal 
convergence, a prerequisite for euro adoption, in certain phases of convergence in 
this new environment.  Financial liberalization and integration may lead to sizable 
changes in the composition of final demand, and through this, considerable movements in 
the equilibrium real exchange rate. As policies also work rather differently in the new 
environment, some even argue that they are ineffective, policymakers may face a double 
challenge in this regard.  
                                                           
2  Some of these factors might have played an equally important role in previous convergence episodes but received 







II.   THE CONVERGENCE PROCESS   
RAMS are catching up with the average income level in the EU, and with each 
other, at a relatively rapid pace. The pace of convergence has accelerated since the turn 
of the century when EU accession became a central scenario for business. At the same 
time the dispersion of per capita relative income within this group started to decline 
rapidly, that is, the convergence also gathered pace among RAMS themselves (Figure 1). 
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Both phenomena are mostly explained by the acceleration of convergence in the 
Baltic countries. These economies kept up with the fastest-growing emerging market 
economies, while the growth performance of the others has been, overall, more modest 
(Figure 2). 
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Exports product structures of most RAMS have also improved rapidly, indicating 
that these countries have a significant potential to absorb modern technology (Igan et 
al., 2007 and IMF, 2006).  Given their relatively high educational achievements and the 
fact that their financial systems are well-developed, this is not surprising. Differences 
across countries in this regard are, however, also likely to be influenced by the quality of 
education and, more broadly, by their attractiveness for technology-transferring FDI 
(Figure 3). 
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Caselli and Tenreyo (2005) call the attention to the importance of the initial 
production and employment structures in explaining the speed of convergence, 
especially in the early phases of convergence. Indeed, the share of agriculture, 
particularly if measured by employment, is rather different in RAMS, with Poland, 
among others having much higher shares of employment in agriculture (Figure 4 Chart on 
agricultural employment). The resulting scope for sectoral shifts can, in principle, be a 
source of rapid growth in the coming years in these countries, as was the case, e.g., in 
Spain. The issue, however, is broader than just agricultural employment even in Poland. 
The level of employment, and thus the potential in increasing labor input, is rather 
different across the RAMS, with the Baltic countries having relatively high employment 
levels by EU standards (Figure 5).  
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The process of convergence is associated with high current account deficits and 
rapid real appreciation in several RAMS. The recent experiences of the Baltic 
countries and Bulgaria are of particular importance in this regard, though the origins, and, 
thus, the longer- term implications for growth are likely to be rather different in these 
cases (Figures 6-8). The flip-side of real appreciation in RAMS with fix exchange rate 
regimes is somewhat higher inflation, though a periodic acceleration of inflation is not 
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III.   THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Though findings are not always robust and/or theoretically well understood, there 
are several factors that are consistently found to influence growth performance in 
empirical studies. In what follows we shall review some of these findings and try to 
relate them to theoretical models in order to understand the channels through which, and 
the ways in which, they might influence catch-up potential in the RAMS. We shall also 
review how these factors might influence the adjustment to a new equilibrium and, 
through this, the variability of output and macroeconomic vulnerabilities. Of course, with 
perfect markets, fully informed agents, and flexible prices, theory would suggest no 
impact of such variability on potential growth. But these assumptions are not necessarily 
plausible for the RAMS (or other EU Member States). Thus major deviations from 
potential output create vulnerabilities—mostly, though not only, through large external 
gross financing requirements. Moreover, they also limit growth potential because of 
extended periods of distorted relative prices and slow responses to relative prices 
changes.  
Other things equal, a lower initial income level seems to be associated with more 
rapid growth: lower-income countries, on average, do converge with higher-income 
countries. As the RAMS’ income level is still significantly lower than that of the rest of 
the EU (Figure 1), this factor will potentially work in their favor, as it has done since the 
beginning of transition. The evidence for an interaction of this exogenous catch-up factor 
with policy determined factors, however, is much scarcer and more recent. Schadler et al. 
(2006) offer some evidence on the interaction with institutional quality and financial 
integration. These interactions are of particular importance to RAMS because European 
integration, by design, brings about major improvements in these areas.
3    
Aghion et al. (2006) offer a model that can establish a link between domestic savings 
and growth performance in a small open economy. This is an important, though long 
overdue, theoretical result. Even though it has been a widely-held view in economics that 
domestic savings matter for growth also in a small open economy, theory has long offered 
little support for this view.  A crucial element of this link in the above model is the 
capacity of domestic banks to cofinance investments by foreign firms that bring local 
firms closer to the industry frontier. As monitoring is crucial to ensure efficient use of 
external financing by firms, the higher domestic savings are—the higher the domestic 
banks' capacity to cofinance—the higher foreign investment and, thus, the faster 
convergence to the efficiency frontier will be. 
                                                           
3 Schooling, which influences a country‘s capacity to adopt new technologies (Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes, 2002), does 
not seem to have a strong explanatory power for the RAMS, perhaps because differences among them in this area are 







Schadler et al. (2006), however, find no evidence of this link to domestic savings for 
growth rates in the RAMS. Instead, they offer evidence suggesting that higher current 
account deficits—that is, more reliance on foreign savings—on average, speeds up 
convergence.
4  
Is this a contradiction, or a finding that reduces the relevance of this model? Not 
necessarily. The banking sector in most RAMS is dominated by foreign-owned banks 
that can bring in foreign financing at large scales and that have already developed the 
necessary capacity to efficiently monitor local firms.  In fact, in the early phase, foreign-
owned banks mostly specialized in corporate financing and moved into the retail sector 
only more recently. So, there is a very plausible explanation for the fact that RAMS can 
easily substitute foreign for domestic savings
5 and, on average, converge fast with the rest 
of the EU despite relatively low domestic savings (relative to, for example, South-East 
Asian countries, see Schadler et al., 2006). Large-scale FDI, and more broadly, openness 
to foreign ownership, is another factor that makes this channel less relevant. We shall take 
up this issue below.           
In another seminal contribution, Aghion et al. (2005) present a model to explain how 
financial development can enhance the growth potential once it reaches a threshold 
level.
6 This is an issue that has long been in the center of attention (Greenwood and 
Jovanovic, 1990, Levine, 1997, Demigrüç-Kunt and Levine, 2001). This model, however, 
is of particular interest to RAMS as it explicitly accounts for technological transfer and 
the role of financial development in this, a central mechanism for the convergence of 
RAMS. Their model predicts an acceleration of growth once financial intermediation 
(proxied by the private credit-to-GDP ratio) reaches a threshold level (at around 25 
percent based on their estimates); and provide empirical evidence to support this 
prediction of their model.   
Though these results would suggest a strong relationship between financial 
development and growth in the RAMS, empirical evidence is weak. Credit-to-GDP 
ratios in RAMS are above this threshold level and credit growth is well in excess of 
nominal GDP growth in most RAMS. Nonetheless, Schadler et al. (2006), for example, 
find no evidence that this factor is serving to enhance growth potential in these 
economies.
7  
Again, this is not necessarily a contradiction. While increased access to credit is a 
                                                           
4 Abiad et al. (2007) provide further empirical evidence and argue that Europe (RAMS) is different in this regard. They 
also make the important distinction between steady state growth and convergence, which might be essential to 
understand why previous studies for larger sets of low-middle-income countries found no evidence supporting this link 
(Kose et al., 2006), or found that capital tended to flow "uphill" (Prasad et al., 2006). 
5 For example, in Latvia, foreign borrowing by (mostly foreign-owned) domestic banks amounts to more than half of 
their total lending (to residents and non-residents), and over ⅔ of their deposit base. 
6  Empirical investigations in Aghion et al. (2005) and Aghion et al. (2006) do not include RAMS as no reliable long-
run data are available for these countries, simply because data for pre-transition periods are not very meaningful in this 
regard. The lack of data for a longer time period, of course, make it rather difficult to draw any conclusion from 
empirical work on the nature of the effects these development factors have on the growth or convergence potential of 
RAMS. 
7  It is, however, important to mention that they include variables that measure institutional quality, which might pick up 
some of the effects of the key mechanism involved in the models in Aghion et al. (2005) and Aghion et al. (2006), 







positive development even if it is used for financing consumption or housing investment 
(since it allows households to optimize their consumption over a much longer time 
horizon) the contribution of credit expansion to potential growth is greatly dependent on 
how the increased credit is allocated. In the model of Aghion et al. (2006), this comes 
down to the assumption that credit finances innovation, or in  that of Aghion et al. (2005) 
that finance is essential for the technology transfer—which clearly do not apply to credit 
that goes to nonproductive use, such as durables or housing. And indeed, the share of 
consumption and housing loans, is significant in the RAMS, albeit with important 
differences among countries (Figure 8). Thus, depending on the actual share of credit that 
finances innovation or technology transfer (more broadly, productive investment) in a 
given sample, one may or may not find financial development as a direct growth 
enhancing factor.
8   
FDI is another important factor that can enhance potential growth and convergence. 
It can directly finance innovation and/or transfer technology, and thus substitute for local 
innovation.
9.RAMS have been benefiting from large FDI inflows since the beginning of 
transition, though to varying extent. Similarly to debt finance, the structure of FDI is key 
to understanding its implications for real convergence. FDI that finances or creates a real 
estate boom, in itself, is clearly not a factor that speeds up the convergence to the 
production frontier in the receiving country.
10  
Financial development and integration, however, can also increase vulnerabilities, 
especially if they take place in countries and periods that are characterized by major 
market imperfections. Improved access to credit by households, especially in countries 
with large pent-up demand for housing such as Latvia, can increase the demand for 
nontradable goods and shift resources in a dramatic fashion towards nonproductive uses 
even in the medium term. This, in turn, can lead to a sizable widening of the current 
account deficit and a considerable real appreciation—comparable in size or even larger 
than that generated by the B-S effect. Moreover, with sticky prices, the initial 
deterioration in the current account is significantly higher than with flexible prices, 
further increasing vulnerabilities (Box 1). This mechanism seems key to understanding 
recent developments in some RAMS with very large current account deficits and rapid 
asset price inflation, such as Latvia.  
                                                           
8 For example, the share of loans to households and for real estate development in the increase in loans to the private 
sector (excluding financial institutions) amounted to 75 percent in the past year (12 months up to end Q1 2007) in 
Latvia.   
9  In fact, Aghion et al. (2006) directly estimate the implication of FDI for the impact of domestic savings on long-term 
growth and convergence and find that FDI makes this impact smaller, though still important. FDI is equally relevant to 
the model in Aghion et al. (2006).  
10  For example, in Latvia, 12 percent of cumulative FDI went into the real estate sector, and 37 percent into the 









Box 1. Factors determining real exchange rate trends in converging economies 
The discussion on real exchange rate trends in converging economies has so far 
focused mostly on the possible size of the Balassa-Samuelson (B-S) effect. The general 
consensus is that this effect is modest (on average, 1-2 percent annually) (e.g., Kovács, 
2002).  More broadly, sectoral data for EU15 countries suggest that even in the euro area 
(a single market with a common currency), there are several uncertainties surrounding the 
very basic assumptions underlying the B-S framework, most importantly the one price 
assumption for tradable goods (Carsten and Ruscher, 2007). Moreover, recent movements 
in the real exchange rates of some of the converging economies have been much more 
dramatic than the estimated extent of the B-S effects, and real appreciation occurred even 
when TFP growth was mostly generated in nontradable sectors (e.g., Latvia).  
Recent research in the European Commission, however, provides important insight 
into alternative mechanisms that might be equally important in determining real 
exchange rate trends in RAMS. They may also help better understand the recent 
experience of RAMS that witnessed rapid real appreciation, way beyond the possible 
extent of the B-S effect. Results of stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model-based 
simulations (Lendvai, 2007) seem to suggest that financial integration, most importantly 
increased access for households to credit, can be one such important factor. These results 
show that removing credit constraint on households, while leaving TFP growth 
unchanged both in tradable and nontradable sectors, leads to a persistent real appreciation 
and a widening of the current account deficit in the medium-run —just like in the case of 
the B-S effect. The long run implications are, however, markedly different from those of 
the B-S effect. The real exchange rate appreciates only temporarily, in the long-run it 
depreciates slightly (relative to the baseline) to generate the current account surplus 
necessary to service the higher net external debt accumulated in the first phase. That is—
unlike in the case of the B-S effect where the appreciation is permanent—the real 
exchange rate goes through major adjustments twice before a long-run equilibrium is 





                                                           
11 In discussing recent experiences of Portugal and Spain, Blanchard (2007) presents a model that can produce a similar 
outcome, but the shock in his model is a change in preferences, namely increased impatience (decrease in the discount 
factor). While we have evidence that supports an easing of the credit constraint on households in several RAMS, we 
have little to suggest a sudden change in preferences in any of the known episodes of rapid real exchange rate 








Figure B1.1 Real exchange rate trends under different scenarios: Increased access by 
households to credit (upper panel) and TFP shock in the tradable sector (lower panel) 
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Source: Lendvai (2007). 
Note: In the first simulation (upper panel), the loan-to-value ratio is increased by 10 percentage 
points for collateral constrained households, while in the second one (lower panel) there is a 
permanent 5 percent increase in the level of TFP in the tradable sectors. Both simulations are 
carried out with the same 2-country, 2-sector model in which 3 types of households are 
distinguished (Ricardian, collateral constrained, and liquidity constrained). Solid line: flexible 
exchange rate regime with sticky prices; dashed line: flexible exchange rate regime with fully 
flexible prices; -- - : fixed exchange rate regime with sticky prices; -- - --: fixed exchange rate 
regime with fully flexible prices. T = related to Traded goods sector, NT = related to Non-Traded 
goods sector. 
These results also shed some lights on the vulnerabilities rapid financial 
development and integration can create in RAMS. As one would expect, when prices 
are sticky, the exchange rate regime matters in the short run: a fixed exchange rate regime 
generates a larger current account deficit (relative to the baseline) than a flexible 
exchange rate regime. That is, the extent of vulnerability to adjustment risk will depend 
on several factors, and trade-offs between these. These factors include the stickiness of 
prices, the extent of unhedged balance sheet exposures, and the degree of nominal 
flexibility afforded by the exchange rate regime.   
 








Figure B1.2 Current account developments following an increase in the access of 
collateral constrained households to credit. 
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Source: Lendvai (2007). 
Note: See notes to Figure B1.1. Results shown in this figure refer to the first scenario described 
above (increasing LTV). Solid line: flexible exchange rate regime with sticky prices; dashed line: 
flexible exchange rate regime with fully flexible prices; -- - : fixed exchange rate regime with 
sticky prices; -- - --: fixed exchange rate regime with fully flexible prices. T = related to Traded 
goods sector, NT = related to Non-Traded goods sector. 
These findings offer a useful frame of reference for exploring some aspects of 
economic developments and policy challenges in the converging EU economies.  
Notably, the two shocks illustrated here may be hard to distinguish initially, so policy-
makers may face a diagnostic problem. Meanwhile, the adjustment challenge facing the 
economy will be very different under these alternative scenarios. Under the ‘household 
collateral shock’, quite a significant corrective depreciation could be needed over the 
medium term: how smoothly this is achieved will depend on rigidities in the economy and 
on the capacity to switch resources and restart strong productivity growth at that stage. 
The implications for policy of this diagnostic uncertainty and potential adjustment 
challenge are explored in more detail below.  
It is, however, important to note that the distinction between investment in 
productive and non-productive uses is not necessarily the same as the one between 
investments in tradable and non-tradable sectors. The overall productivity of an 
economy, and its long-term competitiveness, is not only a function of productivity in the 
tradable sectors—an issue that received considerable attention recently in Europe—but 
also the productivity of the non-tradable private sector, and that of the government sector. 
As Blanchard (2006) shows, higher productivity in non-tradable sectors can enhance the 
competitiveness of producers in tradable sectors in the same way as productivity increase 







 In fact, as he argues, for many PAMS—and we would add RAMS—it is much easer to 
implement reforms that enhances productivity growth in non-tradable sectors than attract 
more investment in high tech sectors.
12 
 
Moreover, regarding RAMS, it is also important to keep in mind that the share of 
foreign ownership in tradable sectors, particularly in export sectors is rather high. 
That is, production technologies and managerial practices in a considerable part of the 
tradable sector are likely to be close to the efficiency frontier. In fact, many producers in 
tradable sectors are fully integrated into the global production networks of their parent 
companies. Rapid improvements of export product structure and export unit values in 
several RAMS, such as Hungary, Czech Republic, reflect this fact (IMF, 2006). In a way, 
the catching up is near full in these parts of the economies of RAMS. While this is a very 
positive development, this also means that productivity growth in RAMS in these sectors 
will be driven by developments at the frontier and, thus, will be similar to that in the rest 
of the EU. The catching up potential is thus related to the increase of the relative size of 
this part of the economies of RAMS. However, as evidence in Schadler et al. (2006) 
suggests, this is limited in most RAMS, most likely because of the relative lack of highly 
skilled labor, and institutional weaknesses that limit the capacity to rapidly reallocate 
resources. Looking forward, increasing the supply of highly skilled labor will take time 
and will require major improvements in the educational systems of RAMS, mostly in 
their higher education. While this is a crucial area for structural policies, private sector 
involvement is critical to improve allocative efficiency and ensure incentive 
compatibility.   
 
The size of the government is found by some to influence growth performance, also 
in RAMS (e.g., Barro, 1991, or more recently Aslund and Jenish, 2005, and for RAMS, 
Schadler et al. 2006). A large government may reduce the growth potential because of the 
dead-weight loss stemming from collecting tax revenue; the larger the size the higher the 
loss through this channel. And in most RAMS, the government is similar in size to that in 
the rest if the EU euro area and significantly higher than in countries with similar income 
levels in other parts of the world, particularly in fast growing South-East Asian 
economies (table). The most damaging way of high tax intake is perhaps a high tax wedge 
on labor. Most RAMS score rater poorly in this regard (see, e.g., World Bank 2007) with 
tax wedges twice as high, or more, than those of their fast growing middle-income 
competitors. The Baltic countries, however, compare favorably in this regards, with an 
average size of government relative to GDP about 8½ percentage points lower than in the 
rest of RAMS. It is also important to point out that it is expenditure on social transfers 
and government consumption that explains most of the difference between RAMS and 
their competitors in this regard, expenditure items that are generally not found to enhance 
the growth potential directly (Barro, 1991). Moreover, if social transfer schemes are not 
well designed, which seems to be frequently the case in RAMS, it can significantly 
reduce labor market participation and labor supply. 
                                                           
12  This issue would also deserve more attention in the euro area, as it was lagging behind the US in the past decade 







 Though not only for this reason, employment ratios in RAMS, except the Czech 
Republic and the Baltic countries, are indeed rather low by international comparison (see, 
e.g. Schadler et al. 2006).
13    
 
Nonetheless, size in itself is not necessarily the only, or even the main factor that 
determines how the government will influence the convergence potential of RAMS.
14 
More recent results by the World Bank (2007) call the attention to the quality of 
government (expenditure), and provide some evidence for transition economies that large 
government (above a certain threshold size) hinders potential growth only if government 
is inefficient. They provide important evidence for the efficiency of government spending 
in education and health care in transition economies and RAMS, and use the size of the 
government to approximate the impact of resource waste and deadweight cost. As results 
in Afonso et al. (2006) suggest, with the exception of Slovenia, the use of government 
size as an explanatory variable may not be a major distortion for RAMS (see Figure 7 in 
Afonso et al., 2006).
15  
 
Macroeconomic policies can be very different, however, if an economy has rigidities 
that may impede external adjustment. RAMS with fixed exchange rate regimes, 
currency boards or hard pegs, are indeed growing fast and have major imbalances. 
Schadler et al. (2006) find growth, and partly because of this current account deficit, 
above equilibrium in some of the Baltic countries. Rapid nominal convergences on 
interest rates and high inflation are apparent in this group of countries, producing low, in 
many cases negative real interest rate, which in turn thought to lead to a consumption 
boom (financed by credit) and a shift in investments towards nontradable sectors. While 
these phenomena are apparently present in these countries, it is not clear whether they are 
exclusively or even in the first place related to the choice on the exchange rate regime. 
First, euroization is widespread in countries with fix exchange rate regime, more so than 
in other RAMS, therefore, the low or negative real interest rate on domestic currency-
denominated instruments can have little impact on overall resource allocation. Second, as 
long as the UIP condition holds, the domestic real interest rate will be low in a country 
irrespective of the exchange rate regime if there is strong real appreciation. Finally, a 
fixed exchange rate arrangement, including the currency board, is not necessarily more 
credible than any other arrangement, thus the risk premium is not necessarily lower for 
"fixers". It may be lower if economic fundamentals are stronger and fiscal policy is on a 
                                                           
13 This is another channel through which a large government can reduce the relative income level (though not 
necessarily the long-term growth rate). 
14 There is also a technical issue related to the size of the government in this regard. Productivity is rarely measured in 
the public sectors and, thus, it is typically imputed by statisticians. A quick look into the data suggests that assumptions 
on productivity growth in the public sector across EU/OECD countries are rather similar at around 0-½ a year. If so, by 
design, a larger government (higher share of GDP produced in the public sector) in a country than in another one results 
in lower growth even if the private sectors (and presumably the public ones as well) grow at the same rate in the two 
countries.  
15 Though it may slightly distort the parameter estimate for this variable if the equation is estimated for a wider set of 
countries. There is however, little support in Afonso et al (2006), for threshold size for government (35 percent of GDP) 
chosen in World Bank (2007). The finding by Schadler et al. (2006) that the size of government has a significant 








16 Therefore, it is not surprising that empirical studies (references) find 
no systematic effect of the exchange rate regime on growth performance. 
 
Implications for vulnerabilities, however, might be different, particularly if a fixed 
exchange rate regime is combined with rigidities and imperfections. In an ideal 
economy, once the effects of a shock fade, the economy reaches its new equilibrium and 
resources will be reallocated accordingly. Therefore, there is no impact on long-term 
growth performance. For example, regarding the case of removing credit constraints 
discussed in Box 1, as households and other agents reach their desired net wealth 
positions and restructure their portfolios of financial and real assets and liabilities, the 
consumption and housing booms end and the economy finds a new equilibrium. With 
imperfect or missing markets and sticky prices, however, relative prices, including the 
relative prices of foreign exchange and labor, are persistent and, thus, remain distorted for 
a considerable period—increasing vulnerability and eventually reducing the convergence 
potential. Policies, thus, might matter.  
IV. CHALLENGES FOR POLICY 
In this setting of financial integration and real convergence, the key challenges for 
policy are two-fold. First, an over-arching priority is to foster high potential growth 
over the medium term, thus raising the speed limits on economic activity. Second, policy-
makers must engage in suitable risk management, to avoid adjustment stresses that 
could set back the real convergence process. The framework illustrated above suggests 
important ways in which policy can contribute to both objectives. 
 
Macroeconomic and structural policies, jointly, will have a key role to play in raising 
the ceiling on potential growth. A key concern will be to ensure that the scope for gains 
from financial integration is fully tapped. This requires a strong emphasis on actions to 
improve resource allocation. Credible macroeconomic policies can help ensure moderate 
real interest rates. Structural fiscal reforms to increase the efficiency (and thus reduce the 
size) of government and to rearrange priorities with a view to enhancing human 
resources, developing infrastructure, and avoiding distortions will enhance potential 
growth. Labor and product market policies can help shift resources toward new 
opportunities for productivity gains. Prudential policies can seek to counter capital market 
imperfections. Overall, the emphasis will be on maximizing potential gains from 
technology so as to raise total factor productivity, with financial integration playing a 
strong supportive role. 
 
The risk management challenges facing policy-makers in containing vulnerabilities 
and enhancing adjustment capacity are complex. Nonetheless, it seems feasible to map 
these to challenges for the main branches of policy: 
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•  A first source of uncertainty and potential risk lies in the nature of the shocks 
that the economy is experiencing. As discussed above, an expansion driven by 
easier household borrowing constraints will ultimately require a correction of the 
real exchange rate to divert resources to debt service. During the correction phase, 
rigidities in the real and financial sectors may prove costly in terms of output 
foregone. In other words, the expansion will be an equilibrium process but may 
involve a testing adjustment phase. By contrast, where the drivers of growth are 
favorable shocks to productivity, then the need for later real depreciation will be 
lower and the adjustment challenges less. Initially, however, the symptoms of 
these shocks may be hard to distinguish, leaving policy-makers unclear about the 
magnitude of the challenges ahead. 
 
•  A second source of risk lies in distortions and incentive problems. These could 
cause a misallocation of resources, and move the economic expansion away from 
an efficient path. Distortions could stem from fiscal programs that affect financial 
markets (such as mortgage subsidies) as well as the real sector. Incentive issues 
may also be significant in the financial sector – for example, where moral hazard 
results from guarantees of deposit liabilities, or where private sector agents rely 
unduly on a commitment to exchange rate stability. 
    
•  Experience in advanced and emerging market economies points also to the 
risk that errors in fiscal policy could cause an unintended stimulus during the 
economic and financial upswing. Public revenues may benefit strongly from the 
tax-rich composition of activity during a financial boom, and there are risks that 
policy-makers may also underestimate the cyclical position of the economy. Such 
errors could lead to an unintended fiscal stimulus that impairs resource allocation 
– including by triggering unwarranted real appreciation. This could also 
complicate adjustment by reducing the stabilizing capacity of fiscal policy when a 
domestically driven boom loses steam. 
 
These considerations suggest that policy-makers need to engage in a comprehensive 
risk-return strategy – enhancing resource allocation, and thus pushing out the frontier of 
potential growth, while also safeguarding the economy against adjustment stress.  
 
There is clearly a strong potential for complementarity between the measures 
required to pursue these twin goals. Nevertheless, it will be valuable to analyze as far 
as possible the nature of the shocks affecting the economy and hence the potential 
demands on policy—and especially the adjustment challenges—that may lie ahead. Here, 
a promising analytical route is to simulate different combinations of shocks to the 
economy (for example, building on the DSGE approaches illustrated here). This can 
provide a basis to explore what underlying shocks and patterns of allocation are 
confirmed by observed trends in incomes, output, prices, the real exchange rate, the 
external balance and—with particular emphasis—sectoral productivity trends.  







In designing policies, moreover, country authorities need to take account of specifics 
in the EU integration and convergence context. On the one hand, the trade and 
integration opportunities of EU Accession and Membership, and the scope for 
institutional strengthening in line with the acquis communautaire, pose unique 
opportunities to raise the speed limits on growth. At the same time, this environment also 
fosters accelerated financial integration, thus raising the stakes for polices to the extent 
that it amplifies both opportunities and, in some ways, costs of policy failure. Moreover, 
policymakers in the converging economies have faced questions about the efficacy of 
economic instruments in managing financial risks in a rapidly integrating environment. 
 
This concern about policy efficacy deserves careful exploration. There are certainly 
potential constraints on policy in this environment. Even where exchange rates are 
floating, there are limits on the autonomy of monetary policy, including through the 
prevalence of euro-denominated borrowing. Foreign-owned banks, which account for an 
overwhelming proportion of financial assets, have deep pockets in terms of capital and 
liquidity—meaning that prudential measures may have limited traction. And in a setting 
of ever deeper financial integration, credit controls are not likely to work well: they will 
tend to divert flows to cross-border or less supervised channels.       
 
Clearly, policy is far from powerless. But effective risk management requires policy-
makers to internalize four cross-cutting features that are particularly pronounced in this 
policy environment: 
 
•  Policy interactions, as always, can be mutually reinforcing. But with large 
balance sheet risks they may not operate with the conventional sign. With 
unhedged foreign currency exposures, nominal depreciation can potentially be 
deflationary—affecting the desirable fiscal stance to flank devaluation.
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•  Policy actions may have strong distributional effects: (1) depreciation in the 
presence of large currency exposures may compress the existing non-trade goods 
sector, which is unlikely to be hedged; (2) prudential tightening may particularly 
impact locally owned banks, and firms with less access to diversified funding, and 
both aspects of this may affect SMEs severely even in economies with relatively 
well-developed financial systems; and (3) monetary tightening and nominal 
appreciation may need to be sharp where the role of the domestic currency in 
financial intermediation is modest: the brunt of this will fall unevenly across 
firms. These distributional considerations underscore the case for fiscal measures 
to play a full role in the policy mix. 
 
•  Lying behind concerns about the “policy impotence” are two regime related 
issues: (1) there is an understandable reluctance to reactivate monetary policy, and 
potentially moderate unhedged borrowing, by ending hard-peg regimes; and (2) 
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there is currently something of a vacuum as regards local systemic risks in large 
foreign-owned establishments—e.g., sector concentrations or intra-group funding 
vulnerabilities. In both cases, there are circumstances in which policy may need to 
“think outside the box” to regain full effectiveness. In other words, there are 
issues of regime design as well as policy calibration. 
 
•  Many measures are complementary, with mutually reinforcing benefits for 
adjustment and growth. This includes the scope for growth-oriented fiscal 
consolidation. But in some respects, policy-makers face tough trade-offs. This 
may be true of some measures needed to assure a risk-averse fiscal policy. 
Equally, the shift from a peg to a flexible rate, or even the very active use of 
interest rates under a flexible regime, may entail increased short-run volatility in 
the economy. This may be desirable to dampen excessive risk-taking, and even if 
costly may still be key to avoiding larger risks to growth in the future.   
 
Therefore, it will be important to rely on quantified macroeconomic scenarios in 
exploring policy options. These models can also support the design of appropriate stress-
tests, which capture compound risks, and help explore the scope of policy interactions. 
They provide, too, some objective basis on which to discuss difficult inter-temporal trade-
offs of the kind highlighted above. 
 
To provide a sound basis for policy-making, such scenarios need to build in 
explicitly a number of financial stability factors.  
•  The evidence from productivity growth about resource allocation during the 
boom, and the medium-term implications of different assumptions on this, 
including for swings in net foreign liabilities and the real exchange rate.  
•  The impact of balance sheet risks, where vulnerable exposures may lie in any 
sector of the economy—firms, households, banks, government, and the aggregate 
external balance sheet—and the interaction of sector exposures can be of key 
importance. 
•  Concerning the saving-investment balance of the private sector, the impact on this 
of rapid financial integration, credit growth and asset price increases: sensitivity 
analysis could explore how far the external current account might widen as a 
result, on varying assumptions about the fiscal stance. 
•  As regards real exchange rate adjustment, an exploration how adjustment through 
different channels—nominal exchange rate, wage and price level—may interact 
with rigidities, such as wage and price stickiness, and balance sheet exposures. 
 
Together with the other issues discussed above, these considerations underscore that 
policy-makers face important analytical challenges. Gaining a better understanding of 








This paper has suggested some elements of a framework for thinking about “speed 
limits on growth” in the converging economies of the EU (RAMS). It has 
distinguishing throughout between the challenges relating to potential growth and to 
adjustment risks. But in both respects it has laid particular emphasis on the interaction of 
financial integration with real economic convergence.  
 
The factors that may limit the convergence potential most in RAMS seem to be  
•  Resource waste in public sector;  
•  Government policies that reduce labor force participation by distorting the relative 
price of labor; and  
•  Policies that promote shifting resources to nonproductive uses in the private 
sector, particularly when they are combined with market inefficiencies and sticky 
prices.  
Though to a varying extent, Central and East European RAMS seem to suffer from 
all these problems, while Baltic RAMS face the latter as a major challenge. 
Consequently, the most important ways of increasing the speed limit on growth potential 
in the former group is to enhance efficiency of government expenditure, most importantly 
on government consumption and social transfers, and use most of the efficiency gain not 
needed to restore fiscal sustainability for reducing the tax wedge on labor. The latter 
would also help with increasing employment. Since the housing boom in the Baltic 
countries—which in the short run boosts growth—is still ongoing, the possible negative 
impact on the convergence potential cannot yet be detected. Moreover, relatively small 
and efficient governments and increasing labor utilization will mask any negative effect 
by this factor. Nonetheless, it may turn out to be an important factor that could reduce an 
otherwise high growth potential and threaten macroeconomic stability.           
Regarding policies, five main conclusions flow from this analysis: 
 
•  A key goal for policy frameworks should be to unlock the full potential 
offered by financial integration, including the interaction of cross-border flows 
with institutions that are well-placed for monitoring credit contracts. 
•  The nature of shocks to the economy is important. For example, higher 
productivity in traded goods, or an easing of collateral constraints on households 
will have rather different impact on growth prospects and will create different 
adjustment challenges. But, from the initial symptoms, it may be hard to discern 
which shocks are actually occurring. 
•  This argues for a comprehensive approach to policy management. One that 
aims to foster strong potential growth, to contain vulnerability risks, and to 
enhance adjustment capacity. In such a strategy, measures that promote higher 







•  Policy is far from powerless to influence these outcomes. But the specifics of 
the EU convergence setting mean that particular attention is merited to the 
direction of policy interactions; the sectoral impact of measures; the design of 
policy regimes; and the inter-temporal trade-offs that may face policy-makers. 
•  The need to evaluate policy options, and also to design realistic stress-tests, 
argues in favor of developing quantified macroeconomic scenarios. This is one 
of several areas in which deeper economic analysis can shed light on policy 
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